SPRING SEMESTER 2001

Three Hours Credit

Political Science 470m (undergraduate credit)

Political Science 570m (graduate credit)

(This course may also be taken for pass-fail credit as PSC 471m or PSC 571m; consult with the instructors or the Political Science Department for further information.)

Dr. Glen Browder

Eminent Scholar in American Democracy

Political Science Department

Jacksonville State University

Jacksonville, AL 36265

256-782-5356

www.browder@jsucc.jsu.edu

Dr. Aaron B. Hayes

Adjunct Professor

Political Science Department

Jacksonville State University

Jacksonville, AL 36265

256-782-5650

In democracies, civilian authorities bear primary responsibility for healthy relationships between civil society and the armed forces; they must develop adequate skill, knowledge, and experience to wield vast authority afforded the civil side, relative to the military, in modern representative government. The military, on the other had, generally enters this relationship with a certain inherent advantage over the civilian sector; it usually knows exactly what it wants--personnel, equipment, training, pay—and it can be expected to pursue its claims unchecked in the absence of a strong civil counterpoise. Enhancing the relationship between these key players is of utmost importance as the world works its way toward global democratization and stability. The objective of this course is an understanding of the principles that come into play as civilians (particularly the legislative branch) and the defense establishment struggle to reach political consensus and national security.

This course will consist of four seminars (lectures, guest speakers, and outside reading) in Room 1103c of the JSU Library from 9 a.m. – 12 noon on the second Saturday of each month (January 13, February 10, March 10, and April 14) during Spring Semester 2001. Some scheduling adjustments may be made if necessary to accommodate the instructors’ schedules.

Students are expected to attend all four seminars, read outside material, participate meaningfully in the seminar, and write a research paper (10-15 pages). Students registered for pass-fail credit are not required to write the research paper. There possibly may be field trips, optional for students with no impact on the final grade, to Washington or California (to be determined later).

Course Material:

The following reading material will be available at the library and at Dr. Browder’s office; additional material may be provided periodically:

l. Blechman, Barry M., The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy. (New York, Oxford University Press, l990).

2. Ippolito, Dennis S. Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense. (Washington, DC, National Defense University, l994).

3. Lindsay, James M., Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. (Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, l994).

4. Mayer, Kenneth R., The Political Economy of Defense Contracting. (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, l99l).

5. Ricks, Thomas E., "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," The Atlantic Monthly, (July, l997), pp. 66-78.

6. Rosner, Jeremy D., The New Tug-Of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security. (Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic and International Studies, l995).

7. Snider, Don M. and Carlton-Carew, Miranda A., U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition. (Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic and International Studies, l995).

8. Stockton, Paul, "Beyond Micromanagement: Congressional Budgeting for a Post-Cold War Military", Political Science Quarterly. (Volume 110, No. 2, l995), pp. 233-259.

Part I. Generalizations about Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy.

l. What is civilian control and why is it important?

1. The nature of the civil-military problem (sources of conflict between

Part II. The United States Experience: Congress and the Pentagon.

1. A Constitutional " invitation to struggle".

2. The historical relationship between Congress and the military.

3. The process and politics of Congress-Pentagon relations.

Part III. The Changing Civil-Military Relationship in a Post-Cold War World.

1. The end of the Cold War has affected—in ways that we do not yet fully

1. It appears that greater responsibility (authority and accountability)

will accrue to civilians in the democratic world.

2. A workable solution to the basic civil-military relationship is an

Part IV. Conclusion.

Mature democracies have developed a number of institutions (such as the U.S. Constitution with its Bill of Rights and independent Judiciary), principles (such as separation of powers, civilian control, military professionalism, and an unusually strong freedom of the press), and practices (such as regular, required defense reports, hearings, and budgets) that perpetuate healthy civil-miliary relations. It is incumbent upon civilian and military leaders not only to respect such institutions, principles, and practices, but also to build, strengthen, and exercise their responsibilities within a civil-military relationship properly characterized by conflict, cooperation, and civilian supremacy.