By Former Congressman Glen Browder (PhD)
Eminent Scholar in American Democracy
Jacksonville State University
Jacksonville, AL

It seems like everybody's got a cure for the Democratic Party and its "southern problem" as our new leadership tries to chart a course through troubled times.

Few question the basic facts of this problem: (1) most whites in the South used to vote automatically for the donkey but now vote overwhelmingly for the elephant; (2) the Old Confederacy en bloc provided George W. Bush with an almost insurmountable lead over both Al Gore in 2000 and John Kerry in 2004; (3) this vast, seemingly Republican region will gain Electoral College power in coming years; and finally, (4) any Democratic ideas about an emerging majority inevitably depend upon dealing successfully with the southern problem. Unfortunately, most recommendations currently circulating among diverse sectors of Democratic society seem to be weak, narrow, self-serving fixes.

Liberals and Centrists: Finesse the South. Most often, curative types attempt to finesse the touchy southern issue with gratuitous rhetoric about aggressive outreach, bold talk about inclusion and marketing. For example, proud liberals press the party to take its historically progressive message more forcefully "to every voter, in every state, throughout America" (sometimes explicitly and at other times implicitly targeting the South for special attention without mentioning left-wing political baggage). Pragmatic centrists, citing success with a new and different brand in the past decade, push the party toward moderate voters of "mainstream America" (presumably enhancing its southern appeal without resorting to right-wing dogma). However, family discussions about the future of the Democratic Party inevitably erupt into frenzied discombobulation when someone mentions that guy in the Confederate-flagged pickup truck.

Radical Progressives: Forget the South. More radical thinkers question the continued logic of nationwide, regionally apportioned parties pandering to eclectic blocs; they claim that, in today's setting, there is no sense trying to craft a hoary geo-national majority. These creative Democrats, armed with intellectual theory and think-tank resources, reject the politics of philosophical accommodation; instead, they imagine a differently defined, differently based, truly progressive agenda for Democratic America. Expectedly, many of them urge their party to forget the South altogether.

New Southerners: Preaching the Gospel of Southern Salvation. Also unsurprisingly, southern progressives (particularly academic and journalistic types encrusted in New South religion and unwilling to be finessed or forgotten) are jumping, once again, into the fray with old- time southern salvation for the soul of national Democracy-sanctifying liberal values with a southern accent, shepherding the region's biracial underclass, converting errant rednecks, and anointing an enlightened southern prophet atop the national ticket.

But, despite their sincerity, these varied suggestions from proud liberals, pragmatic centrists, radical thinkers, and southern progressives strike me as inadequate potions for the real problems of southern and national politics; or perhaps to be honest about it, I just don't like them for some reason or other. What's missing is practical advice grounded in theoretical analysis that deals directly with the basic reasons and future prospects for our Democratic distemper.

My Advice: Crack Dixie with a Fresh, Moderate Embrace. So, here's some very pointed advice-intended as the latter sort-for Chairman Howard Dean and my party. I believe that the Democrats are destined to be the minority party in an importantly altered environment, a new rational/national two-party system, as long as they forfeit the Solid South; so, in my opinion, the Democratic Party's best bet for re-emergent majorityism is a revised version of an old idea, cracking this regional bloc with a new strategy embracing moderate southern voters.

I offer this personal perspective as a long-time public official in Alabama and Washington and as a longer-time academic analyst of regional and national developments. Just as pertinently, I'm a southern white Democrat who's not interested in switching parties, launching petty recriminations, or sitting in silent stupor while things deteriorate beyond repair. What I offer is, like the other cures, pretty simple; it is not all new or original; nor do I expect Democratic bluebloods to accept my prescriptive analysis in toto. But I think it presents sound political criticism, useful theoretical insight, and some constructive guidance for my troubled party.

A Thesis of Entrenching Democratic Minorityism in America's New, Rational/National Two-Party System.

In the rest of this paper, I'll elaborate my thesis of "Entrenching Democratic Minorityism," discuss our party's "convulsive distemper," define our "blue conceit," try to explain the "southern problem," theorize about the "rational nationalization" of America's two-party system, and recommend a potential solution to our national troubles.

National Electoral Trends and Future Partisan Prospects.

An Emerging Democratic Majority? According to John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira in The Emerging Democratic Majority (2002), the GOP era depicted by Phillips is coming to an end: "A longer trend … is leading American politics from the conservative Republican majority of the 1980s to a new Democratic majority. Democrats aren't there yet, but barring the unforeseen, they should arrive by the decade's end." To paraphrase the EDM message, "our kind of people" are increasing while "their kind of people" are decreasing; and a new realignment of political power, based on "progressive centrism" in "ideopolises," will sweep our party into power.

The idea of an "Emerging Democratic Majority" has powerful theoretical, evidentiary, and emotional appeal; however, the last two elections have raised major questions about the practical evolution of this concept.

Election 2002. The mid-term elections of 2002 (repeating the patterns and disappointments of Election 2000) dashed the hopes of many partisans for immediate emergence; and some quickly posed the alternative possibility of an "Emerging Democratic Minority."

For example, Michael Lind of the New America Foundation dismissed the EDM concept totally ("The Emerging Democratic Minority"; November 8, 2002):

Licking their wounds, Democrats may try to blame the outcome of Tuesday's mid-term elections, which gave the Republican party unified control of the US government, on contingent factors such as inept candidates and President George W. Bush's war-boosted popularity. But it is clear that the results are the latest episode in the 30-year decline of the Democratic Party.

EDM disciples scurried for convincing explanation. Salon's Joan Walsh reminded both skeptics and faithful partisans, quite correctly, that Judis and Teixeira had stated their projection as trend analysis, not as hard prediction for any specific election ("Donkey in Distress"; November 18, 2002):

The fact is, the book didn't predict an immediate new world order of
Democratic dominance. It merely pointed to the building blocks of a
Democratic majority — it was the party that was supposed to put it together, and
didn't, this time around … So even with all of the party's problems, it's no time
for Democrats to despair. In 2004, they'll get another shot, maybe a clearer
shot, at putting together the Democratic majority that shimmered on the horizon,
a mirage, in this election. Let's hope they're ready to make the most of the
opportunity when it comes.

Election 2004. Election 2004 was "same-old same-old" poison for disheartened Democrats, and gloating Republicans had a field day. According to Horace Cooper, senior fellow with the Centre for New Black Leadership, the Democrats were an historical study of collapse and meltdown ("Outside View: Emerging Democratic Minority"; December 1, 2004):

The party's impending collapse was a long time in the making. Becoming more obvious in the 1980s and picking up steam in the 1990s, the steady decline in electoral performance by the Democratic Party was apparent to those willing to see it. But leaders — and the secular fundamentalists who make up the activist party base-refused. Each loss or setback was explained away while an effort was launched to find a new way to wrap the same package. The failed candidacies of Carter, Mondale, and Dukakis did not represent in any way a direct rejection of the party or its philosophy; they represented unique circumstances out of the candidates control, tactical failings or unethical and divisive campaign techniques on the part of the GOP.

Citing a Democratic leadership in the resolute grip of progressive cultural and economic orthodoxy, Cooper projected that the trend is likely to continue: "In practically every demographic, support for Democrats declined. The collapse has happened and it can no longer be denied."

Considering the grim dimensions of the Democratic Party's contemporary performance, it is appropriate for concerned Democrats of all persuasions to ask not only about the current health of our party but also "Whither our long-term course in a transforming party system?"

Current Partisan Picture. I'll not dwell on the statistical scorecard of partisan power; others have documented thoroughly and convincingly Republican electoral prevalence recently and their mixed but ascendant record over the past several decades. Irrefutably, the Republican Party now controls most forums of public policy-making in the American system.

Of course, the GOP electoral advantage is far from institutionalized hegemony; even in the South, Republican strength will never compare with historical Democratic dominance. As Political Scientist Don Raber states in a recent assessment ("Three Challenges for Southern Republicans"; April 2005), much of its appeal seems tenuous and temporal, with limited growth opportunity; and current philosophical/issue/candidate developments could alter the landscape.

Future Partisan Prospects. Theoretically, there is reason to anticipate party resurgence on the far horizon because of trending conditions congruent with a projected Democratic majority. As I have written elsewhere (The Future of American Democracy; 2002), America is certainly changing in important ways; and eventually a more diverse and progressive society will prevail:

Our nation is indeed bifurcating into two distinct cultural societies and
political personalities — "Traditional America" and "Emerging America" —
each with legitimate but starkly different visions of our national destiny. On
one hand is "Traditional America" — an historically dominant white society,
rooted in rural, small town, middle regions, which subscribes to religious
convictions, community values, and conservative government. On the other
hand is "Emerging America" — a growing, eclectic society of relatively
progressive, minority, and historically disadvantaged citizens in urban and
coastal areas who are inclined toward social diversity, moral tolerance, and
liberal government … Culturally, "Traditional America" will yield to
"Emerging America" in the next few decades. America inevitably is going to
become a more expansive, inclusive, pluralistic society, with intensified
cultural dissension over democratic ideals, values, and governance; and
traditional, majoritarian, homogeneous, advantaged society will yield its
dominant status to emerging, minoritarian, heterogeneous, disadvantaged
society.

However, I believe that it would be a major statistical miscalculation and political mistake for my party to bank on its anticipated share of the inevitable societal divide. This evolution will be a long time developing, and it will produce unpredictable outcomes along the way. Traditional America likely will maintain control — as a plurality force inclined toward the Republicans — for some time; and Emerging America probably will be a very mixed society, with cross-cutting pressures on traditional party alignments, and with no guarantee of dominating dividends for the Democrats. Furthermore, as the Twenty-First Century extends, American democracy itself will change in ways that perhaps will radically impact the normal functioning of the two-party system.

Most pertinently for my thesis and regardless of the contours and parameters of future America, it is hard to imagine that either party can assume majority status without securing significant portions of the South; or, putting it in reverse terms, any party that automatically writes off such a sizeable bloc constituency faces minority status into the far future.

Our Emerged and Entrenching Minority Status. To summarize, while the "Emerging Democratic Majority" is an intriguing notion, it seems an unlikely prospect under current circumstances; and it may be just entertaining speculation for the far future. The hopeful partisans are statistically right — a Democrat can win the Presidency without any southern state, and the Democrats can take over the House and Senate without a single southern member; but neither scenario is realistic. As for the long run, it may be true that America is changing in ways that seemingly favor the Democrats, even without southern support; but I would not bet on such a quick, neat, deterministic unfolding of our partisan destiny.

So it seems clear to me that the Democrats have indeed emerged as the putative and functioning minority party for the time being; more importantly, we seem intent on entrenching our minority status, in an apparently real two-party system, into the foreseeable future. Just as clearly, many leaders and activists are having difficulty dealing with their minoritarian dilemma.

Contemporary Democratic Distemper Over the Party's Proper Political Course.

Strategic Debate. Most commonly and simply, as stated earlier, there's conventional strategic debate — unfortunately based on static assumptions — between liberals (who pin their hopes on historical values and constituencies) and centrists (who want to move toward middle, moderate voters); each wistfully and wispily envisions the magical majority within its grasp.

Tactical Arguments. Then, there are tactical arguments, usually about "hollering louder … or at least clearer and more effectively" to an American public that doesn't understand things appropriately. Rhetoricians think that artful adjustment of the party's propaganda and photo ops will win over voters anywhere and everywhere. Finally, organizational types put their faith in raising more money, adopting more modern technology, and developing a more robust, grassroots operation.

Desperate Measures. More desperate operatives push regional and ethnic personalities for the party's presidential nomination. Some hope that a third party candidate will afflict the Republicans (a reverse Ralph Nader). Others tinker with the primary nominating system; and a few keep harping about changing or eliminating the Electoral College itself.

Cosmic Forces. Of course, many just hope and trust that the political cosmos will shift back in our favor. Professional party prognosticators insist that President Bush and his crowd will over-reach and blunder fatally. Sympathetic journalists predict that the American people will smarten up eventually. And some social scientists assert that demographic dynamics point decidedly in Democratic directions. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, several scholar/analysts claim that the basic foundations of American society are already shifting towards Democratic revival.

Like Dinosaurs Waiting for the Weather To Change. The problem with the current debate, in my opinion, is that it would take an incredible combination of prevailing strategy, tactical adjustments, desperate measures, cosmic forces, and demographic dreams — all orchestrated by a distemperate mob — to generate a reliable governing majority in the transforming national party system. We can come close, but we put ourselves at continued systemic disadvantage (both presidentially and congressionally) as long as we refuse to make serious adjustments in our overall national strategy.

All this discussion reminds me of John Naisbitt's comment about big, obsolete institutions refusing to adjust to the realities of changing America (Megatrends; 1982):

There are cities and companies, unions and political parties, in this country that are like dinosaurs waiting for the weather to change. The weather is not going to change. The very ground is shifting beneath us. And what is called for is nothing less than all of us reconceptualizing our roles.

I also recall his advice: "Make sure the company you are working for has a long-range view of the future or you may find yourself in one of the next dying industries — -or in a company that is dying in a growing industry." Unfortunately, the Democratic corporate prospectus reflects short-term and unrealistic attitudes toward America and the American voter marketplace.

"Blue Conceit," "Red America," and the Southern Connection.

The current typology of "Blue America-versus-Red America" is a useful framework for my thesis about the Democratic Party's wayward ways and a possible solution.

It seems to me that too many extremely Blue Democrats, including some good friends of mine, have yet to recover from Elections 2000 and 2004. These extremely Blue Democrats (I'll call them XBDs for short) consequently evidence, in addition to their indignant denial of historical, systemic dynamics, an intense antagonism toward "Red America."

Blue Conceit. The debilitating fault of XBD Syndrome is not liberalism simply and by itself, although contemporary liberalism is unattractively out of step with heartland culture (not only because of Republican propaganda but also because of Democratic obsession with contentious issue positions). The egregious aspect of the prevailing XBD mindset is "blue conceit," a paralyzing conviction of angry, self-serving righteousness that blinds them to historical reality and impedes corrective action for our future. To wit: "Dammit! We cannot believe so many redneck idiots voted for that boob! But we will prevail because we are America!"

Blue Hangover. Day-after-the-election comments from New York illustrate this point very well (Joseph Berger, "A Blue City"; December 4, 2004):

A cosmopolitan Democrat (while dog-walking in internationalized Manhattan) shared his
mixture of disappointment and contempt:

I'm saddened by what I feel is the obtuseness and shortsightedness of a
good part of the country-the heartland …This kind of redneck, shoot-
from-the-hip mentality and a very concrete interpretation of religion is
prevalent in Bush country — in the heartland.

A film producer (who frequents Elaine's restaurant and spends time in Central Park talking
politics with homeless people) explained things through the prism of superior consciousness:

What's different about New York City is it tends to bring people together
and so we can't ignore each other's dreams and values and it creates a
much more inclusive consciousness. When you're in a more isolated
environment, you're more susceptible to some ideology that's imposed on
you.

An art dealer added that savvy New Yorkers were not as fooled by Bush as were other
Americans. Recalling her Midwestern background, she says "They're very 1950's …When I
go back there, I feel I'm in a time warp."

Then, in a spirit of missionary zeal, the film producer said:

If the heartland feels so alienated from us, then it behooves us to wrap our
arms around the heartland. We need to bring our way of life, which is
honoring diversity and having compassion for people with different lifestyles,
on a trip around the country.

Internet XBDs were especially brutal in another post-election report (Joseph Curl, "Blue States Buzz Over Secession"; November 9, 2004):

We were all going to move to various other countries, but then we thought —
why should WE move? We hold our noses as we fly over you. We are
sickened by the way you treat people that are different from you. The rest of
the world despises America, and we don't want to be lumped in with you
anymore.

Dixie Disdain. More specifically for my thesis, XBDs hold particular disdain for the South as freakish, ignorant, racist embodiment of "Red America." While they realize that we need heartland votes, XBDs reflexively and awkwardly flinch every time someone suggests that the Democratic Party's future may course through Dixie.

Slate columnist Timothy Noah expressed that disdain very bluntly in proclaiming, prior to the 2004 elections, that "Democrats don't really need those southern votes" ("Forget the South, Democrats"; January 27, 2004):

The Democrats' ceaseless courtship of Southern votes has fostered an unhealthy sense of entitlement. Southerners now consider it their God-given right to supply Democrats with presidential candidates or, failing that, to force non-Southern candidates to discuss Him using an alien evangelical vocabulary … there's a long cultural history of Northerners snubbing Southerners … but there's an even longer political history of Southerners whining and wheedling their way into disproportionate and undeserved power … For Democrats, the South has become the Sahara of the Electoral College. Give it up.

John Kerry unfortunately articulated a speculative variation of that reasoning shortly thereafter, proclaiming in a Dartmouth College speech that "Everybody always makes the mistake of looking South … Al Gore proved he could have been president of the United States without winning one Southern state, including his own." Of course, Kerry soon reversed course in his campaign rhetoric, but he went on to lose, as did Gore, every southern state and the Electoral College.

In Washington, disheartened Democratic insiders talked sarcastically about "Red America" and the South (Curl; "Blue States … ").

Veteran Democratic strategist and media analyst Lawrence O'Donnell said he's tired of "Blue America" paying the bill while "Red America" runs things, gets most of the goodies, and then gripes about what the federal government does:

Some would say, "Oh, poor Alabama. It's cut off from the wealth infusion that it gets from New York and California … But the more this political condition goes on at the presidential level of the red and blue states, the more you're testing the inclination of the blue states to say "so what?"

Fellow operative Bob Beckel acerbically advocated southern independence the day after Kerry's loss; "I think now that slavery is taken care of, I'm for letting the South form its own nation. Really, I think they ought to have their own confederacy."

Grieving and Gripping. I don't want to pick on New Yorkers, Washington insiders, media analysts, or electronic partisans; similar remarks creep into the conversation whenever three or more grieving partisans gather, in places as disparate as San Francisco and my hometown of Jacksonville, Alabama, to vent their feelings. Southern XBDs are especially pained in the merging torment of their regional origins and progressive inclinations.

At the end of their grieving, however, allegiant Democrats eying the American heartland must re-connect with southern voters; and to do that they have to come to grips with their so-called "southern problem."

The So-Called "Southern Problem" and the Real Southern Problem.

But their approach to corrective action errs in two very serious respects.

Misreading History. In the first place, I'm doubtful that my party understands the nature, magnitude, and potential permanency of its problem. The party leadership insufficiently comprehends the historical dynamics of southern and national politics, dynamics that for several decades have been institutionalizing our diminished standing in a new, fully developed, rational/national two-party political system (arguably the first such system in our nation's history).

Resisting the Future. Just as importantly, there's the dysfunctional, elitist cultural mindset (identified earlier as blue conceit) that resists the central, necessary correction — dealing aggressively and positively with the South and our transforming partisan environment — for future revival in heartland America.

To restate my contention, the Democratic Party's real problem is (1) its inability or refusal to acknowledge the historic, systemic dynamics of southern and national politics, and (2) its stubborn reluctance regarding a potentially workable southern solution to our national troubles.

The fact is that too few national partisans understand the serious ramification of our southern predicament.

Understanding Southern History and the Transformation of American Democracy.

Regionalism and Racism. The South has always operated as a problematic, contradictory, stubborn subset of America, operating from the beginning as a regional, semi-colonial society warped forever through the original sin of slavery. It confounded the national democratic experiment with a perverse politics of caste and class (overlapping racism and poverty) for most of its history; and it has engaged in tortuous consequent wrangling and soul-searching for the past half century.

Ever-Twisting "Southern Strategies". Southern politics is, in historical respect, a consciously collective endeavor among driven white elites and compliant white masses, a continuously calculated pattern of identity and manipulation, a series of "southern strategies" designed to maximize regional culture, independence, and power within the American national system.

Actually, the original "southern strategy" was the constitutional accommodation of southern concerns (particularly protecting slavery) as a condition of agreement to the U.S. Constitution and participation in the American federal system until the Civil War. Then, after re-assuming control of its affairs and until the middle of the Twentieth Century, the Solid South continued functioning as a regional system of white, one-party rule in complicit arrangement with the national Democratic Party, which secured for itself a monopoly on this vast region's votes for Congress and the White House. When the Democrats began to question this discomforting relationship during the 1950s and 1960s (and began courting newly enfranchised blacks), white southerners instinctively looked for more responsive national partners; and they gradually allied with the Republican Party in a strategic relationship which, like the earlier Democratic version, was based on racial tensions in the Old Confederacy.

Contemporary Cultural Change. The legacies of slavery and segregation are still evident throughout the South; and racism continues to be an important factor in contemporary southern life. However, race no longer dominates as the driving force of southern strategy or as the singular explanation of southern politics.

Over time, as the South has accommodated inevitable change, southern leaders have abandoned consciously collective Old South ways; interestingly, furthermore, while southern white and black citizens cherish varying degrees and aspects of their "southernness", they generally reject the dark side of that heritage. For the most part,southern politics has shifted toward broader class considerations — factors that sometimes mirror its historical racial system but just as often reflect contemporary social, religious, and economic differences between black and white society and between the South and the rest of the country.

Thus the South's historical perversion — virtually excluding African-American citizens from public life in complicit arrangements with the national parties — no longer dominates southern politics or warps the region's relationship within the broader American nation . In fact, while many disagree with the South's growing substantive influence, contemporary developments here reflect the prevailing, sometimes problematic patterns of national life rather than grotesque regional distortion of American democracy. Much remains to be done about discrimination in this region, but today's transforming South more accurately can be described as an historically scarred but valuable learning laboratory for America's still-flawed "Great Experiment".

Rational Nationalization. These transformations seem to me to be a unique and healthy strategic adjustment for the South, charting its course according to conventional cultural and political bases rather than the historical perversity of race. The South is experiencing, essentially, a rational regional alignment with the national parties, as the white majority generally inclines toward the Republicans and its black minority aligns overwhelmingly with the Democrats, in a logical normalization of politics similar to that of the rest of the nation.

In that process of rational nationalization, then, both southern politics and American democracy are being transformed systemically. Despite the oft-troubling nature of its history, the contemporary South seems to be more rationally and civically participant in the course of American democracy; and this disproportionately empowered constituency likely will continue to exercise major influence on our pluralistic national politics.

Our Consequent Democratic Dilemma. Thus the United States is developing a real two- party system with Republicans pretty much in charge for now and as long as the Democrats avoid their regional dilemma.

As a southern politician and academician during the past few decades, I've always been amazed that the Democrats never seemed to grasp southern strategic history, the power of cultural considerations in the southern mentality, and eventual difficulties facing the national Democratic Party. Did the national Democratic leadership ever question why both whites and blacks in this region voted Democratic for so long during the latter half of the past century? Did they just assume that everybody down here would forever vote outdated partisan loyalties? And why didn't somebody notice long ago that Democratic officials were disappearing from the southern political landscape?

Whatever their reasons, Democratic leaders apparently ignored or helplessly succumbed to these regional trends; and the South has become a Republican bastion. Democrats are dominant in certain circumstances and in various locals, but they generally and increasingly are relegated to "holding on" and minority status. Furthermore, we now find ourselves as the loyal opposition in most forums of public power in a rational/national two-party system that pits "Blue Democrats" against "Red America."

A Strategic Recommendation: The New Southern Road to "Red America".

This idea has been discussed and debated so much over the past few years that it lacks any standing as a breakthrough recommendation; and XBDs gag at its mere mention as a topic for discussion. But this simple, almost simplistic idea bears re-examination now amid harsh, nagging questions about our Democratic future.

Certainly my raising the "real southern problem" and proposing a "southern solution" is no stranger than the panicky thrashings of other pro-Democratic commentators in the aftermath of 2004. For example, Slate's Timothy Noah, who advised Kerry and the Democrats to forget the South last year, seemed just as floundering as was his Democratic candidate ("Whither Liberalism?"; November 3, 2004):

In the coming days, a heartfelt dialogue will begin in which Democrats ask themselves, in a refreshing spirit of constructive self-criticism, why they can't connect with the American middle class. I have been listening to, and occasionally contributing to, discussions on this topic for more than two decades, and they began well before I tuned in. By now, the very subject makes me want to scream …

So, what should the Democrats do? In the words of Jack Benny: I'm thinking, I'm thinking!

Katha Pollitt, The Nation columnist, issued a similar confession two days after the election ("Why Americans Hate Democrats"; November 5, 2004): "What should the Democrats do? I'm going to be bold and say what almost no other commentator will tell you: I don't know."

Noah and Pollitt were not alone in their ponderous quandary. The public record has proclaimed regularly since the election that the Democratic Party is "ailing," "split," "shaky," "soul-searching," "clueless," and "heading in the wrong direction."

A Sensible Gameplan. In light of these assertions and our party's performance in both the recent and long-term past, maybe it's time to consider trying the southern road — but with a different and realistic gameplan. There are several reasons why this strategy makes sense for our party.

Electoral College Bounty. The most compelling argument for my new strategic roadmap is the obvious fact that the Old Confederacy possesses over half the Electoral College votes needed to win the presidency; add border states Oklahoma, Kentucky, and West Virginia, and the proportion climbs to about two-thirds of the magic number. In effect, in both 2000 and 2004, the Democrats' southern problem provided George W. Bush with a virtually automatic, almost insurmountable lead over Al Gore and John Kerry.

National Population Projections. Census data demonstrate more projectively and ominously why our party cannot afford to forfeit this regional market. During the next quarter century, the South, as a big slice of the growing Sun Belt, will continue to play a key role in the significantly changing American political system. As demographer William H. Frey has shown in several analyses (most recently "The Electoral College Moves to the Sun Belt"; May 5, 2005):

What becomes clear, when adjusting the Electoral College in line with the new projections, is that the 60-year period between 1970 and 2030 will constitute a major transformation: from an era of near Snow Belt-Sun Belt parity to one of sheer Sun Belt dominance.

Of course, such census projections are highly speculative and state-by-state political patterns are just as important as regional comparisons, but the Old Confederacy will increase its Electoral College bounty by 19 votes (mainly in Florida and Texas), while Democratic markets in the North and East will shrink (New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio will lose a total of 14 votes). Nationally, Frey calculates that by the 2030 election, Solid Red states will outvote Solid Blue states in the Electoral College by a 194-117 count; interestingly, re-jigging the 2004 election to a 2030 model swells the Republican margin from 286-252 to a whopping 303-235.

Ideological Functionality. The Democratic Party also must devise a new southern gameplan because of ideological and issue ramifications that extend beyond the Old Confederacy to crafting a resonant national message.

Apparently, the Democratic presidential candidate who moves significant portions of voters among these eleven states also appeals to constituencies in border and battleground states of "Red America"; contrarily, any Democratic candidate/message that totally ignores the core South inevitably weakens the campaign in key areas outside this region.

Very instructive is the historical record of the past nine presidential elections (the period since the tumultuous 1960s when Barry Goldwater and George Wallace reshaped southern politics). My quick and rough analysis shows that, in that span, any Democratic candidate who captured at least three or four southern states also won 80-90% of state elections in the border area (Oklahoma, Kentucky, and West Virginia) and enjoyed similar success in key battleground states (I looked specifically at Ohio, Missouri, and New Mexico); and these candidates were elected President of the United States. On the other hand, when the Democrats have been shut out in the Old Confederacy, they also lost about 80-90% of the elections in both the border areas and in the three cited battleground states; and none of these candidates were successful nationally. Simply stated, the historical record suggests that the key to Democratic victory is crafting a message that wins at least three-four southern states and that consequently appeals to similar cultural and political affinities in important areas elsewhere.

Institutional Considerations. Additionally, targeting the South makes sense in terms of more indirect factors related to the vitality of the Democratic Party as a really national institution. Democratic efforts in southern locales tend to strengthen the national party's ability to recruit candidates, train workers, and raise money; and it's always a good idea to force the Republican Party to expend some of its money and energy in this region rather than directing all its resources to more competitive and critical areas.

Democratic Civic Duty. Most importantly for the long run, however, the Democrats should re-engage the South because any party that aspires to lead America ought to have a national message and constituency. Running the "Great Experiment" entails a certain level of civic responsibility for American democracy itself as well as cynical, mechanistic, partisan victory.

Alabama's Example. Allow me to offer my home state of Alabama and the 2004 election as an example of what happens when our national party writes off the South and the partisan struggle runs cynically awry. John Kerry visited us early, raised some money, promised to fight in all 50 states — and we never saw him again. Of course, he had to make tough choices; and considering how the campaign developed, I cannot blame him for focusing where he had realistic prospects.

But, in the process of that election, Alabamians went to the polls with a Democratic ticket headed by an absent Presidential candidate (who was certifiably the most liberal senator in the country) and an unknown African-American Senatorial candidate (who didn't spend enough money to require a financial report). State and local Democratic candidates were swamped in the Republican tide.

Alabama Democrats have lost too many races in similar situations over the past few years, and it is getting increasingly difficult to recruit candidates, raise money, and run campaigns as a viable party. Nowadays, our candidates for congress, governor, state legislature, sheriff, county commissioner and other offices — including some outstanding prospective public leaders — have to distance themselves from the national party, run flawless campaigns on limited resources, and hope the Republicans screw up, just to be competitive.

Considering our history, this Democratic policy of hit-and-run politics is not likely to serve the progressive interests of an evolving Alabama. It reinforces the tendency of culturally, religiously, and economically conservative white citizens to vote overwhelmingly Republican; and it encourages black citizens to cast their votes, virtually in mass and futilely, for the atrophying opposition.

Places like Alabama likely would not vote for candidates like John Kerry anyway; but I imagine such scenarios were also playing out in more promising states, reinforcing the Solid South and "Red America" as faithful Republican provinces.

Electoral practicalities aside, I ask, "Is this kind of democracy — a common partisan practice of regional civic truancy — befitting our proud, historic Democratic Party?" The good people of this area and America deserve better from my party.

Of course, my contention invites ridicule as trite provincialism. But I really wonder whether powerful XBD partisans understand southern history and transformational dynamics, whether they realize that the Democratic Party could struggle again in 2006, in 2008, and into the foreseeable future, as the minority party in a logically coherent, fundamentally sound, and stable national arrangement.

What To Do?

(l) Understand the Rational Nationalization of Southern Politics and American Democracy.

For openers, let's review our old college notes from Political Science 101 and American History 101, take a good advanced seminar in Southern Politics, read current census projections — and quit figuring out how to win without the South. We Democrats must acknowledge that the South has not only changed its politics, it is fundamentally transforming American democracy in like manner, thereby creating a real two-party system with Republicans advantaged in most aspects of American governance.

(2) Confront Blue Conceit.

Then we must confront and change the elitist mentality that afflicts too many party faithful and impedes successful correction of our course.

Divining Dixie from the Outside. Since I cited and quoted New Yorkers in my earlier critique of blue conceit, I will let another outsider, Berkeley-educated journalist Jacob Levenson of Brooklyn, explain how the contemporary South could be a recuperative experience for XBD Syndrome ("Divining Dixie"; March/April 2004).

After an extended visit to Alabama, Levenson realized that, to most outsiders, the South is a black-and-white image that functions to make America feel artificially good about itself:

Nobody seems to know exactly what to make of the South anymore … When
we do think of it, it is often frozen in time: Martin Luther King Jr. marching on
Selma or Sheriff Bull Connor's men spraying fire hoses on civil rights marchers.
Those are the images rehashed on PBS, anyway. Strangely, we seem to
treasure those black-and-white memories, and when we drag them out, we do
it with a sort of pride. It's as if they remind and reassure us that we are a
people who will stare down hatred and injustice. They served as symbols of
what we'd like to think we're not.

A Stilting Stereotype. In a sense, Levenson suggests, stereotyping the South actually limits our commitment to a bolder agenda as a nation:

The difficulty with this enterprise is that the South is still often cast as completely
other. So … talking about race in the South becomes a way of not talking
about race in the rest of the country. It's a point worth highlighting, and it
extends beyond race … the political horserace stories that can casually frame
God, guns, and gays as southern concerns promise to oversimplify southerners'
relationship to these issues, and, at the same time, relegate the national struggle
to come to terms with these same issues to the periphery of the debate.

Levenson goes on to say that the South offers the nation an opportunity to recognize and address its own dark issues:

… it strikes me that one of the basic tensions that threads its way through
many southern stories has to do with whether the region is still chained to its
racial past, or whether it has reached catharsis, redeemed itself, and joined
the rest of the country … I would suggest just the opposite, that the South is
on the leading edge of a whole series of stories that are vital to the rest of the
country because it has been forced, largely by virtue of its racial past, to
publicly confront issues that the rest of the nation has been able to avoid.

A Revealing Reflection of America. I hope that my Democratic Party will move beyond blue conceit, beyond provincial stereotypes, toward Levenson's assessment of the South as a painful yet useful portrait of the American experience. He challengingly relates grainy old images of the segregated South to contemporary America:

Yet these images are useful in this respect only to the extent that we believe
that "the South" is somehow a place that exists culturally, socially, and
physically apart from the rest of the country. This strikes me as a provincial
and largely artificial conceit. The South, with its fine-tuned sense of civility,
self-determination, and morality has always powerfully mirrored our national
character. And it remains a startling, beautiful, complex, and in many ways
revealing reflection of America and what we've become.

Despite excessive whiffs of magnolia perfumery, Levenson's essay should be required reading for all Democratic Party leaders and activists as they re-consider the southern option.

(3) Develop and Implement a "New Southern Strategy".

Most importantly, the Democratic Party must develop and aggressively implement a "New Southern Strategy" for cracking the Solid South.

Partisan outsiders and southern progressives alike yearn, and plot endlessly, for a turn of events or rhetorical debate that might magically convert white southerners en masse into liberal voters. Southern history defies such dramatic conversion, and the South probably will remain a Republican bloc bonanza to the extent that national Democrats continue to ignore or misread southern political dynamics; but we can win national elections with the right plan and something less than a sweep of the Old South.

Strategic Reconceptualization. Considering historical and systemic constraints, the Democratic Party's realistic options must begin with aggressive reconceptualization, reconfiguration, and retargeting of the huge mass of southern voters. We don't need to chase every right-wing redneck or carry the entire region to retake the White House; all we need to do is pick off two, three, or four relatively moderate states — such as Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Georgia — as has been done by the only successful Democratic presidential candidates in the past half century. In that process, we also may pick up valuable seats in our quest for the House and Senate.

I will leave it to the professional operatives to develop specific, tactical elements and procedures, but it is clear that we must incorporate attitudinal, behavioral, and substantive policy change into our reconceptualized strategy. To speak the unspeakable, the Democratic Party must genuinely embrace the moderate South, balance traditional values with economics, and develop a heartland policy agenda. As we've seen in the past, half-hearted photo ops with attractive southern candidates, preaching to the choir of loyal southern liberals, and energizing minority constituencies are futile as long as the national party views the entire region as an alien land.

Embracing the Moderate South. Embracing the moderate South means venturing into a land of endearing charm, enduring pride, raucous progress, entrenched poverty, stubborn prejudice, surprising diversity, and countless contradictions. Southerners can be maddeningly distractive, with strange foods, syrupy dialects, and an odd assortment of icons and folkways.

Serious Democratic presidential candidates also inevitably will have to enter the Guy-zone of white southern culture — guns, God, and Old Glory; and whoever steps into that zone also had better walk the walk and talk the talk reasonably well to comfort a skeptical bunch of southern hunters, preachers, and patriots.

Embracing the moderate South does not entail pandering to ignorant, racist rednecks; nor does this strategy require that we nominate Bubba for the Presidency. It does mean "aggressively," "genuinely," and "comfortably" reaching out — while maintaining our historic principles and integrity — to white southerners. This is going to be a tough but rewarding endeavor for outsiders, so perhaps XBD partisans should approach this assignment with the same sense of intellectual curiosity and cultural respect accorded other exotic groups and constituencies invited into the Democratic Big Tent.

Balancing Values and Policy. I believe that most southerners feel relatively comfortable in their lives; however, they are uncomfortable with what's happening in American society. It may be ironic considering the South's historic poverty, but cultural values (such as faith, family, community, and patriotism) trump economic issues among most whites and among many African-American and Hispanic voters in this region. As long as Democratic candidates and the party ignore or insult traditional values (while preoccupied with such issues as partial-birth abortion and gay marriage), the South will vote Republican.

I had an opportunity to discuss our Democratic troubles a couple months ago in a private, informal meeting with former Presidential nominee Michael Dukakis and some California Democratic friends. They seemed very responsive to these concerns about culture, values, and policy; and I don't think they would mind my publicly paraphrasing their response to this blunt interjection of the "southern problem" into our Luncheon Society discussion. Among their ideas, after normal "grieving and gripping" remarks, was the sentiment to do whatever it takes to win again in our lifetime. Interestingly, Dukakis said, in direct response to my questioning, "I'd recommend that one of the first things our new party leadership should do is talk to southern politicians who have effectively dealt with the southern problem."

Conversations with Successful Politicians in the South and Red America. I suggest that Chairman Dean and other leaders/activists consult extensively with practical public officials who have dealt successfully with the cultural and political challenges of heartland America-such as Montana's Democratic Governor Brian Schweitzer. Montana is not the South, but Schweitzer is walking, talking evidence of successfully mixing heartland values and progressive politics (Tim Grieve, "Life of the Party"; April 19, 2005).

In a lengthy interview, Schweitzer responds, sometimes ramblingly but with conviction, to pointed questions about how you get people in the South and West to listen to a Democrat. He talks about "leading with your heart" so that average working people trust you:

You need to have good solid policy — that's important. But you've got to touch
people. They've got to know you; they've got to know that you believe in what
you're saying. And that's probably more important when people vote than your
policies. Because how the hell are they going to raise their families, maybe
work two jobs, go hunting on the weekend, bowl and drink beer with the boys
on Tuesday night, and still have enough time to figure out who's telling the truth
about the budget, about healthcare, about education? … They look up there
and say, "That guy's a straight shooter. If I wasn't so busy bowling and
working and fishing, and if I had time to spend on these issues, I bet I'd come
to the same conclusions that that guy would. But it's a good thing that he's
doing all that studying and stuff, because I'm busy fishing and bowling."

Schweitzer specifically addresses the contentious issue of guns with a message that many will find disturbing; but his comments may be instructive for intensely liberal activists struggling to understand various cultural aspects of "Red America":

I understand that the Democrats in the big cities, on the East and the West
coasts, have a grave concern about gun control … So I can appreciate that
they've got a problem in their inner cities. But that's not what we have out here
in the flyover zone. We have guns because we like them. We have guns
because in some ways it just kind of defines who we are. We like having guns
around. It's not necessarily that you're out shooting — it's knowing that you
could if you wanted to.

When you crowd a bunch of people together, when you've got people living on
top of each other, they're likely to have run-ins. So you need a whole bunch
more laws. When you've got more cattle than people and you've got blue sky
that goes on almost forever, people have got room to roam without bothering
each other. Live and let live.

How does Schweitzer deal with the gun issue in Montana? Through TV commercials about teaching his son to shoot safely as his daughter watches nearby: "In Montana, we understand that passing responsibility from one generation to another with gun safety is part of who we are." As he explains to Salon senior writer Tim Grieve, "So it wasn't about guns, necessarily; it wasn't about family, necessarily; it wasn't about responsibility, necessarily. But it was the nexus of those."

And what about Democrats using more substantive political issues in the "family and moral values" environment of rural, small-town America?

We are the folks who represent the families … You know, in Montana, 20
percent of the people don't have health insurance. They're not indigent, living
under bridges someplace or in a culvert with a sleeping bag. Maybe Mom and
Dad both work. They say prayers with their kids when they tuck 'em into bed,
and then they close the door and they walk down the hall, and they get on their
knees and they pray one more time that nobody gets sick because they don't
have health insurance. They just can't imagine having a sick child and not being
in a position to be able to get the help that they need … That's something that
we've got to fix, and we're fixing it in Montana.

Of course, as I said, Montana is not the South or the United States; and Schweitzer is not running for President. However, his style and substance are worth studying as we contemplate heartland culture and the prescriptive future of our national party.

Heartland Policy Agenda. Democrats do not need to simply mimic Republicans in debates about guns, faith, and the flag. However, I am convinced that, if approached with respect on these matters, a significant portion of southern and western voters will respond positively to traditional Democratic issues.

Perhaps we should follow Governor Schweitzer's example and develop a high profile national policy agenda aimed specifically at the problems that afflict so many citizens in rural areas and small towns of heartland America. For example, we could launch a health initiative for working families, children, and senior citizens who live their lives beyond the advantages and services of urban society. We can offer a new medical infrastructure plan including state-of-the- art health facilities, diagnostic services, and research/education programs for those areas. More generally, we might consider expanding our party's commitment to the middle class, such as Medicare for everybody or at least realistic national health insurance that helps with catastrophic illness and long-term care.

Furthermore, while the Republican Party has focused effectively on international terrorism and expanding freedom, the Democratic Party can push aggressively and convincingly on universal domestic issues, such as social security, educational opportunity, job protection, tax fairness, political reform, and homeland defense — all of which resonate in this part of American society.

Very simply, I believe (based on my own experience, the words of people like Tom Schweitzer, and solid, contemporary polling data) that culturally embraced southerners and heartland voters of moderate temperament may welcome such outreach endeavors.

The Road Ahead. To conclude, in order for the Democrats to succeed as a national party in the future, we must modify our message and style with the moderate South in mind; we must wage a real southern fight; and we must maintain a strong southern "farm team" — -all of which positions us to win our share of the southern electoral bounty and compete more successfully in "Red America." Perhaps then we can restore the Democratic Party to its historic civic and partisan advantage.

Of course, extremely Blue Democrats will object angrily to this southern embrace: "It's Republican-Lite!" "It's Machiavellian!" "It's demeaning!" My equally strong response is thus: "Call it anything you wish. But are you interested in ceding the White House, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the federal bureaucracy to the opposition. And are you happy entrenching the Democratic Party as a permanent minority party for the foreseeable future?"

I am, admittedly, not an intense or active partisan; since leaving Congress I have become more concerned about the civic future of America's Great Experiment than party politics. However I think that it is bad for American democracy for any party to exercise virtual control of the entire forum of governance for extended periods of time; and I'm afraid that's where we're heading unless the Democratic Party devises a "New Southern Strategy" and rebuilds at least part of its southern electorate.

Our Democratic Destiny?

America now enjoys, arguably for the first time in its history, a new, fully developed, rational/national two-party system, with Republicans in charge as long as Democrats forfeit the Solid South and struggle in "Red America." As the Democratic Party debates its place in this altered environment, it is appropriate for us to consider anew all options. Perhaps our future is simply a more powerful, unified march of loyal liberal partisans; or maybe we need a more pragmatic and mainstream agenda. Who knows, the proper plan could be more experimental, a different version of our historical success with coalescent majoritarianism, incorporating progressive ideas drawn from various aggregated segments of the American nation.

Frankly, I doubt that many national Democrats will be able to swallow, completely, the package I've presented in this essay. However, somewhere between the competing scenarios of the "Emerging Democratic Majority" and the "Entrenching Democratic Minority" probably lies sound theoretical and practical guidance; and as we chart our gameplan for the immediate and long-term future, we must include serious consideration of the idea that the party's destiny may course, at least partially, through the South.

Apparently some in the party recognize the wisdom of broad and diverse options. Just recently, Chairman Howard Dean pledged that "We're not going to concede the South … The South will rise again, and when it does, it will have a D after its name." Strong words indeed! But we've heard similarly bold — yet empty — pronouncements in the past.

Thus, it seems that our Democratic leadership and extremely Blue Democrats now face a difficult, dilemmatic reality: actually forging a new, aggressive, workable southern strategy or acquiescing to continued Republican dominance in a fundamentally altered future. The Democratic Party is destined for extended minority status unless it understands and deals realistically with the far-reaching transformation of both Southern politics and American democracy.

SOURCES CITED

Joseph Berger. "A Blue City — Disconsolate, Even — Bewildered by a Red America," The New York Times; November 4, 2004.

Glen Browder. The Future of American Democracy: A Former Congressman's Unconventional Analysis; 2002.

Horace Cooper. "Outside View: Emerging Democratic Minority," The Washington Times; December 1, 2004.

Joseph Curl. "Blue States Buzz Over Secession," The Washington Times; November 9, 2004.

William H. Frey. "The Electoral College Moves to the Sun Belt," Brookings Institution; May 5, 2005.

Tim Grieve. "Life of the Party: Brian Schweitzer, the Blue Governor of the Red State of Montana, May Just Have the Answer to the Democrats' Woes," Salon; April 19, 2005.

John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira. The Emerging Democratic Majority; 2002.

Jacob Levenson . "Divining Dixie: Is It Another Country? Or a Place To Stow National Problems? A Yankee Journalist Gets Lost and Found in the South," Columbia Journalism Review; March/April 2004.

Michael Lind. "The Emerging Democratic Minority," The Financial Times; November 8, 2002.

John Naisbitt. Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives; 1982.

Timothy Noah. "Forget the South, Democrats: Stop Coddling the Spoiled Brat of Presidential Politics," Slate; January 27, 2004.

Timothy Noah. "Whither Liberalism? Again? Here Comes the Usual Bad Advice," Slate; November 3, 2004.

Kevin Phillips. The Emerging Republican Majority; 1969.

Katha Pollitt. "Why Americans Hate Democrats — A Dialogue: The Indomitable Question that Plagues Liberals," The Nation; November 5, 2004.

Don Raber. "Three Challenges for Southern Republicans," SouthNow Program for Southern Politics, Media, and Public Life; April, 2005.